ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
IT systems are a critical resource in most governmental organisations everyday communication and administration. Just as for their everyday tasks, governmental actors depend on all kinds of IT systems for their responsibilities in crisis situations (Santos, Borges, Gomes, & Canós, 2008) . These systems include not only specially built systems for emergency situations but also the everyday communication and administration systems. The latter category of systems is of special interest. Under normal conditions an occasional unavailability of these IT systems is fully acceptable, but in emergency situations, when time is a critical factor, any unexpected unavailability can have disastrous consequences (Zimmerman & Restrepo, 2006; Fleming, 2001) . Therefore it is important that these IT systems are an integral part of all major risk and vulnerability analyses conducted. This way information about the dependability of the different IT systems can be combined with information about how critical the systems are in different situations (SEMA, 2003) .
IT dependability management for organisations with a critical role in society is a complex process and the frequent occurrence of critical IT incidents shows that there is a lot of room for improvement. Earlier research (Weyns & Höst, 2009) has shown that there is a need for a simple but effective framework to help organisations to address these issues in a structured way.
IT dependability management combines important elements of IT management and safety management in three different ways. First of all, the failure of critical IT systems can be a safety risk by itself, causing an emergency situation when the failure wan unanticipated and no backup systems or manual routines are available. Secondly, in the case of an emergency in an organisation many IT-systems constitute an important resource in resolving the crisis, for example internal communication systems and medical information systems. Finally, IT systems also play a crucial role in the communication with the general public in the event of a crisis. This last category contains IT systems used by the traditional media as well as internet news sources and social media.
IT management and emergency management or safety management are different activities within an organisation often involving different parts of the organisation. Therefore there is a need for explicit coordination between these processes to make sure that IT dependability management issues are given the necessary attention (Weyns & Höst, 2009) . This paper presents an evaluation plan and the first results of the practical evaluation of the IT Dependability in Emergency Management Maturity Model (IDEM3) for the coordination of emergency management and IT management (Weyns, Höst, & Li Helgesson, 2010) . The purpose of this maturity model is to help organisations to identify, evaluate and improve their IT dependability processes. The main focus of this framework is on the cooperation between emergency managers and IT personnel.
The IDEM3 maturity model has, in this study, been used for the assessment of the IT dependability management processes in two Swedish hospitals. In this way the applicability of the framework and the value of this assessment for the organisation are evaluated based on two case studies.
In this paper first some related work is presented, both to the IDEM3 maturity model and to the evaluation of maturity models in general. Secondly, the IDEM3 maturity model is summarized and the main elements of the framework are presented. Next, a practical evaluation plan for the maturity model is presented. Finally, two case studies based on this evaluation plan are presented in detail.
RELATED WORK
A number of process improvement frameworks have previously been published, both in the fields of emergency management and IT management. Emergency management is often coordinated on a national level and most countries have a special governmental agency such as the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Emergency Management Australia (EMA), Public Safety Canada or the Russian Ministry of Extraordinary Situations (EMERCOM).
In the field of IT management a number of international standards and best practice frameworks have been published internationally, among those ITIL (Office of Government Commerce, 2007), COBIT (ISACA, 2000) and ISO/IEC 17799 (International Organization for Standardization, 2005) . These frameworks are more suited to be used by large corporations with very large IT resources and are less suited for smaller organisations and often do not take into account the special needs for organisations with an operative role in crisis relief. Vogt et al. (2011) have specifically investigated the use of ICT alignment frameworks in emergency management organisations and found that these frameworks are not well-suited for these type of organisations, mostly because they are not flexible enough. Of these models, COBIT (ISACA, 2000) also makes extensive use of a maturity model.
The maturity model evaluated in this paper is based on a number of maturity models from related fields. The first successful maturity models were developed by the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (Konrad et al., 1996) . Since the development of the Capability Maturity Model, maturity models have been applied in many other fields. In 2008, SEI published a preliminary version of the CERT Resiliency Engineering Framework (Caralli, 2007) for the use in the field of business continuity management with a special focus on IT systems. In the field of IT management, Luftman (2003) presents a simplified maturity model with a strong focus on the business value of IT systems. In the field of safety management, maturity models have also been proposed as a way of assessing an organisation's safety culture (Fleming, 2001) , or product design safety (Strutt, Sharp, Terry, & Miles, 2006) . Santos et al. (2008) have also published a maturity model for the use of information technologies in emergency response organisations. Their model does not cover the dependability of the IT systems in emergency situations, but instead focuses on the information management practices of the organisation. The framework described in this paper is most suited for an organisation where the IT services are provided by an IT department that is part of the organisation. For evaluating the resiliency of IT services provided by external suppliers, Bhamidipaty et al. have developed the Resiliency Maturity Index (Bhamidipaty, Lotlikar, & Banavar, 2007) , a framework for characterizing and evaluating the resiliency of an IT services organisation. However this model does not evaluate the relationship between the resiliency of the service supplier and the dependability needs of the organisation.
BACKGROUND

Background Study
The IDEM3 maturity model (Weyns et al., 2010) presented and evaluated in this study is the result of two case studies at two Swedish municipalities to study their practices and problem areas concerning IT dependability management (Weyns & Höst, 2009 ). The main conclusion from these studies was that many organisations experienced problems and frustrations concerning IT dependability management. The main cause of many of these problems could be traced back to communication and cooperation problems between the personnel in different roles involved. Further these studies also pointed out a lack of useful tools that support IT dependability improvements across a whole organisation. Vogt et al. (2011) have also shown that the IT process improvement frameworks discussed in the previous section don't fulfil the needs of emergency management organisations.
To make lasting improvements to an organisation's IT dependability management practices, a process oriented approach is needed. For the IDEM3 maturity model, it was decided not to develop a variation of one of the models above, but instead to develop a new, specially tailored maturity model to offer a process improvement framework that is simple and general enough to be applicable to many organisations and at the same time effective enough to make a substantial difference in an organisation's IT dependability practices.
The process followed for the development of the maturity model is shown in Figure 1 . First, the case studies in (Weyns & Höst, 2009 ) that describe the need for this kind of maturity model resulted in a list of factors that are important for the coordination of IT dependability management. These key factors formed the first basis for the attributes of the maturity model.
In a next step, the factors were mapped to the general architecture of a maturity model with five levels as found in many other maturity models. For the model to be applicable by small organisations, it was necessary to simplify the structure by replacing the concept of 'key process areas' by the more modest 'attributes' found in the IDEM3 framework.
In this mapping the attributes were also compared and complemented with similar attributes found in maturity models from related fields. Before the model was applied in a practical setting, the model was validated with the help of experts and practitioners in the field. The feedback from these experts resulted in an updated version of the maturity model, as published by Weyns et al. (2010) . 
IDEM3 Maturity Model
Just like most other maturity models, the IDEM3 model has 5 maturity levels. The Initial level is the most basic level, representing an organisation where some critical IT systems have not been analyzed from a dependability point of view and nobody takes responsibility for initiating a more strategic discussion about IT dependability. The second, Managed, level is characterized by an organisation where the dependability of all critical IT systems is managed on a system-by-system basis leaving the organisation very dependent on the competence of the system managers for every system.
The third level is referred to as the Established level. This means that the organisation has established a centrally coordinated approach for dealing with IT dependability. This will usually be established by appointing one central IT dependability manager who distributes standard procedures for dependability analysis to all system managers. A standardized approach is a prerequisite for being able to implement future improvements across the whole organisation. A level 3 organisation also has clearly defined responsibilities concerning IT dependability.
The fourth level, called Quantitatively Managed, is similar to level 3, but also requires that the centrally coordinated approach is supported by extensive quantitative data collection. Regular measurements and testing with special usage scenarios in mind can make IT dependability statistically predictable and allow for strategic improvements in IT dependability.
The Continually Improving level, which is the fifth and final level of the maturity model, is reached by an organisation that can use the feedback obtained from the practices from level 4 to continually improve not only their IT systems, but also their own IT management procedures. IT systems will then be naturally included in risk and vulnerability analyses and their dependability will be regularly re-evaluated.
To define the levels in more detail the levels can be compared on 22 attributes. Of course all these attributes are in some way related and none of them can be changed completely independent of the others. Nevertheless they each add their own focus to the maturity model and stress a special aspect of an organisation's maturity.
Table 1. The 22 attributes of the IDEM3 Maturity Model across the 5 levels
The 22 attributes can be divided in 4 categories: Outcomes, IT management, Cooperation and Organisational Issues. A detailed summary of these attributes can be found in Table 1 and the attributes in each category are also described in the following subsections. The attributes are ordered in such a way that those attributes that are most strongly related are placed next to each other.
The IDEM3 maturity model is much smaller in size than other maturity models such as the CERT REF (Caralli, 2007) . The attributes in IDEM3 fulfil a different role than for example the 26 capability areas in CERT-REF and are much more specific and smaller in scope. This makes it much faster to assess the maturity levels of an organisation's attributes, which can be done directly based on the description in the maturity grid presented in Table 1 .
The main goal of IDEM3 is to be a process improvement tool for organisations wanting to assess and improve their IT dependability practices. The framework should be sufficiently simple to allow a quick assessment with minimal resources. The result of the assessment should be an overview of the assessed organisations weaknesses and strengths in this area, and a roadmap for sustainable improvement. Unlike for some of the other maturity models discussed above, the assessment is not meant to be used as a benchmarking tool for comparing different organisations. In that case there would be a higher risk for bias in the results and the assessment would have very high requirements on its correctness. For the IDEM3 maturity model, the primary value in the assessment is not in exactly determining the organisations maturity level, but in bringing together all involved parties and starting a discussion about all attributes of the model, and identifying those attributes were the organisation needs to focus their improvement efforts.
Evaluation of IDEM3
The IDEM3 maturity model has previously only been evaluated by relating it to other renowned maturity models and with the help of experts from the field (Weyns et al., 2010) . The most valuable evaluation of the framework, through the actual application of the maturity model in a real setting, is the topic of the evaluation plan developed in this paper. This type of evaluation should make it possible to evaluate the applicability, the measuring power and the practical value of the IDEM3 framework. This paper presents an evaluation plan for this type of evaluations of the maturity model. Through two case studies based on this evaluation plan, the results of the first practical evaluations of the IDEM3 maturity model are presented.
EVALUATION PLAN
The planned evaluation consists of a complete IDEM3 assessment, where at the end the participants also evaluate the result of the assessment. The process for one evaluation is shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2. Evaluation process for an IDEM3 assessment
Scoping
The first step in each assessment is always an exact scoping of the planned assessment. It should be defined exactly which organisation, or part of the organisation, is being assessed. From the start, it is important to assure the approval and support of the management of the organisation. Also, a number of systems need to be selected that will be the topic of the collected data, as it is usually impossible to cover all IT systems used by the organisation. For the result to be relevant, the selected systems should be critical to the organisation, and representative for how IT dependability is managed within the organisation. In this step, it is also possible to limit the assessment to a subset of the attributes of the maturity model, instead of all attributes.
Based on this scoping, a first list of interviewees should be compiled. This should include at least the system managers for the selected systems, IT personnel responsible for maintenance of these systems and an IT safety manager, or people in similar positions in the organisation.
Data Collection
In the next step, the necessary data should be collected to make a correct assessment possible. The main source of data consists of the structured interviews with the selected respondents. This can be complemented with the collection of important documents concerning IT dependability management, such as service level agreements, incident reports or strategic IT plans The interviews should be based on a predetermined list of questions, consisting of a number of general questions and a set of questions for each selected attribute.
The proposed outline for the interviews is shown below, where the questions need to be reformulated slightly to fit each attribute. Each interview starts with an introduction followed by some general questions asking about the role of the respondent related to the studied systems and their experiences with the dependability management of these systems. Then, for each of the studied attributes, the interview contains a number of open questions, allowing the respondents to give their main impressions of how the organisation deals with the attribute and of the strengths and weaknesses the respondent experienced in this area. For each attribute there is also the more specific questions Q5a to Q5e, which can be skipped in case they have already been answered completely by the responses to questions QA1 to QA4. Finally, each interview is concluded with some closing questions. Each respondent is also asked to name a few other possible respondents that should be include in the interviews to get a complete picture of the organisation's IT dependability management concerning these attributes. This way it is possible that during these interviews additional respondents need to be added to the list.
Assessment
In the next step, the collected data should be analysed to map the organisation to the levels of the maturity model for each of the attributes. For this step, the collected data should be analysed by the interviewer. Because of the specific questions in the interviews, the analysis should focus mostly on comparing answers from different respondents. When there are clear differences between the studied systems, this should also be studied in more detail based on the collected data.
Based on this analysis, the organisation can be assigned a maturity level for each assessed attribute and an overall maturity level. When many attributes have been assessed, the results can preferable be summarized in a spider graph.
Focus group meeting
The final step of the assessment consists of a focus group meeting where most of the interviewees were present, together with further staff of the organisation with important roles in IT or safety management. During this focus group meeting, the assessor presents and leads a discussion on the results of the assessment for each of the evaluated attributes. For each individual attribute, and for the organisation as a whole, the improvements required to achieve the next maturity level in the maturity model are also discussed. Because there are no other objective measurements of these attributes of IT dependability management, the correctness of the assessment cannot be objectively evaluated. What can be measured is the correctness of the assessment as perceived by the members of the organisation, the novelty of the identified weaknesses and the perceived value of the whole assessment for the organisations. To measure this, the focus meeting should be accompanied with a survey among the participants to collect their opinion on the result of the assessment.
The assessment is only the first step in a larger process improvement effort where practical improvements are planned, implemented and evaluated. However, this is outside the scope of this evaluation study, which focusses entirely on the evaluation of the assessment.
CASE STUDIES
The evaluation plan above was used in two case studies. The methodology used in both case was based on the evaluation plan, although some improvements to the plan were made prior to the second study based on the lessons from the first study. The formal evaluation through the survey form was added to the evaluation plan and was therefore not part of the first case study. The two organisations in the study were selected because they had expressed their interest in assessing their IT dependability management practices to the authors of this paper.
Because of the similarities of the two studies, this section first presents the details concerning the methodology of each of the two case studies. Next the results of the assessment of both organisations are discussed together, followed by the results of the evaluation of the IDEM3 maturity model. Finally, the validity of the case studies is discussed.
Case Study 1
The first object of study was a large hospital in western Sweden, in the rest of this paper referred to as Hospital A. As with most Swedish hospitals, the studied hospital is a formal part of the regional government of the region it's located in. As part of this larger organisation, the hospital depends for all its IT services on the regional IT unit that was formed when local IT personnel were joined in one central IT unit that serves the complete organisation. To limit the scope of this first study, only the situation at Hospital A was assessed. Because this was the first assessment based on the IDEM3 maturity model, it was further decided, in agreement with the organisation being assessed, to limit the scope of the assessment to just two critical systems and to three attributes of the maturity model: Service Level Agreements, Incident Management and Involvement. They represent 3 of the 4 categories in the maturity model and were selected based on the interest of the organisation.
In a first step, the organisation selected two of its most critical systems, two different patient data systems. For both of these systems a number of interviewees were selected by the IT safety coordinator for the region. Because, for practical reasons, the study was to be conducted in one week time the decision was taken to limit the number of interviews to 5: the hospital IT safety coordinator together with for each system the main IT technicians responsible for servicing the system and the system manager of the system. In this study the system manager is a nontechnical coordinator for the system responsible for representing the users of the system at the hospital in the cooperation with the IT department.
During the course of one week, telephone interviews with these 5 participants were conducted by the main author of this paper, based on the questionnaire outline presented above. To complement the interviews, a number of important documents relating to IT dependability were collected.
The interviews lasted about 30 minutes each and the interviewees' answers were recorded on specially prepared forms by the interviewer. These answers were then later transcribed in electronic form for distribution to the other authors of this paper.
The collected data was then independently mapped to the levels of the maturity model by the first two authors and the results were discussed to agree on a preliminary assessment for each of the three assessed attributes.
Finally, the results of the preliminary assessment were discussed during a focus group meeting where most of the interviewees were present, together with further staff of the organisation with important roles in IT or safety management, both from the local and regional level. The results of the assessment were evaluated in a structured discussion about each of the evaluated attributes. The result of the assessment and the evaluation are described in the next section.
Case Study 2
The second case study was also conducted at a Swedish hospital, in the rest of this study referred to as Hospital B. Hospital B is a smaller hospital than Hospital A, located in a smaller city in the same region as Hospital A. Both hospitals have been part of the same organisation for about ten years, since the counties they were located in where joined together in one administrative region. About 5 years ago a regional IT department was created that provides IT services to both hospitals. The assessment performed in these case studies is a small part in the regional coordination of IT and safety procedures across the whole organisation.
The procedure for the second case study was very similar to the first. Together with the organisation under study it was decided to focus on 4 attributes, 2 of which were the same as in the first study, and 2 other ones. This made it possible both to compare some of the results with the previous study while at the same time also evaluating other parts of the maturity model.
For the second study, 9 telephone interviews were conducted with 10 participants. On explicit request of two of the interviewees in similar roles, one interview was conducted with them together instead of separately. 9 of these participants were selected by the IT safety manager, one of the participants was added later based on information gathered during the interviews. The interviews lasted 45 to 60 minutes each, a bit longer than in case study 1 since there was one more attribute to discuss. Again, the answers were recorded on specially prepared forms, but this time the interviews were also recorded electronically for greater accuracy when the answers were later transcribed.
Just as in the first case study, the answers were mapped to a maturity level for each of the 4 discussed attributes. Because of the strong relationship between the different attributes, enough information had been collected in the interviews to allow also a rough estimate of the maturity level of the other attributes of the maturity model, although with a higher uncertainty.
Also in the second case study, the results of the assessment were presented and evaluated on a focus group meeting with representatives of the assessed hospital. For the second case study the assessment was also evaluated through a more formal survey among the participants in the focus group meeting. The results of the assessment and of the consecutive survey are presented below.
Result of the assessments
The results of the assessment of hospital A on the 3 studied attributes can be summarized as follows:
• SLA: level 3 maturity: SLA's are well established as a tool, but are not regularly evaluated or updated as is required in level 4.
• Incident Management: level 3 maturity: Formal incident management procedures are defined and used and some data is collected, but the data is not being analyzed and not available to those who would be interested in analyzing it.
• Responsibility: level 4 maturity: Responsibilities are clearly defined and shared between stakeholders. Many stakeholders are actively involved and the personal relationships between them are mostly good with only some minor frustrations. For level 5 the cooperation should be explicitly evaluated and improved over time. No important differences between the two studied systems were recorded with the same process being used for both systems. For each of the systems and for each of the attributes the level was at least at the 'established' level (level 3) showing that the organisation as a whole has an organized approach towards IT dependability for critical systems. The results of the assessment of the maturity level of hospital B in each of the 22 attributes can be seen in Figure 3 . The four attributes that were the main focus of the study assessment have been marked in the graph. Note that some attributes in the graph are marked at level 2.5, meaning that they were between level 2 and 3.
The results show that the organisation's maturity was at least at level 2, while the majority of the attributes was assessed at level 3 and two organisational attributes were assessed at level 4. The results of the study's 4 main attributes can be summarized as follows:
• SLA: in transition from level 2 to level 3: general agreements are in place, sometimes referred to as SLA's. Standardized SLA's are being worked on. Further, the reliability and security requirements of all systems have been explicitly classified (Basic, High or Very High) to allow IT resources to be prioritized easier.
• Incident Management: level 3 maturity: Formal incident management procedures are defined and used and much data is collected, but the data is not being analysed and not available to those who would be interested in analyzing it. There is some confusion between the procedures for reporting IT related incidents and reporting patient safety incidents in those cases where they overlap.
• IT Dependability Analysis and Emergency Management: between level 2 and 3:
there is close cooperation between the people working with these two issues but it is not made explicit in all documentation of the systems, through emergency scenario exercises, or through specific system testing for emergency situations.
• Organisational Learning: level 4 maturity: A lot of effort is spent on organisational learning concerning IT risk management, and many effective ways of spreading information exist. A lot of progress has been made in this area lately. For level 5, some documentation of routines should be kept up to date and the importance of learning should be made more explicit to all personnel. The overall conclusions of the assessment of the organisation can be summarized as follows. Many attributes are already at level 3 and the first priority should be to also get the remaining attributes stable at level 3. This will mostly require more standardization in these areas, by generalizing good practices that are used in some parts of the organisation to all organisational units.
Figure 3 Spider graph with the results of the assessment of Hospital B, with the four attributes that were the main focus of the assessment marked with dotted lines.
Evaluation of the Maturity Model
The first assessment at hospital A was evaluated informally during a focus group meeting during which the results of the assessment were presented and the comments of the participants in the meeting were written down. 10 employees of the assessed organisation, among them most of the interviewees of the first cases study, participated in the focus group meeting, which lasted about two and a half hours. The focus group was led by the first author, while the second author took notes for later analysis. During the meeting, each of the three attributes was discussed based on the levels in the maturity model, and only then the result of the assessment was given to evaluate whether it matched the impression of the participants in the meeting. The focus group generally agreed with nearly all the conclusions from the assessment, although the maturity level of the first and third attribute was considered as possibly a bit too forgiving for the occasional problems the organisation was still experiencing in these areas. There was agreement that this could probably be explained by the fact that the two studied systems were not typical systems for these attributes, and that with a different choice of systems the assessment might have revealed more of the problems in these areas. The main conclusion of the first evaluation was that there was definite value in the assessment for the organisation, not only in measuring the maturity level of the organisation in the assessed attributes but even more in bringing together the different actors and acting as guidance in a discussion about problems and possibilities within these areas. A result of the positive evaluation of the first assessment was also that there was serious interest from the organisation to do a similar assessment at another part of the organisation. Because of the interest from the safety managers from hospital B present at this meeting, it was decided to conduct a similar, but more elaborate, assessment at hospital B.
At hospital B a similar focus group meeting was held to present the results of the assessment but this time the results were evaluated through a survey that all 13 participants filled in (in Swedish) during the forum group meeting or just afterwards.
For each of the 4 assessed attributes and for the overall assessment we asked participants in the survey to rate the following:
• The assessment error, the deviation of the assessment from what they, based on their experience, considered the correct reasonable maturity level for each attribute, on a 5-point scale from 'much too high' over 'reasonable' to 'much too low'.
• Agreement with the proposed improvements from strongly disagreeing to strongly agreeing, also on a 5-point scale • How much the results of the assessment provided new information to them from 'nothing new' to 'everything was new', again on a 5-point scale • The value of conducting the assessment from 'no value' to 'very valuable', on a 7-point scale. Because the last question was the most important for measuring the value of the maturity model, a 7-point scale was chosen instead of a standard 5-point Likert scale. For each of the questions the respondent could also mark a 'don't know' option. For each of the assessed attributes there was also an open question where participants could write what part was most or least valuable in the assessment.
It was stressed to all the respondents that the opinions expressed in the survey were meant to be based on their personal experience, and not on the consensus from the focus group meeting. We can therefore expect some differences in the answers of different respondents. The following graphs present the respondents answers to the grading questions. The sum of all the bars corresponding to the same question sum up to 13, except for 5 of the questions where one of the respondents did not answer the question.
The top left graph in Figure 4 shows that the assessment was considered correct by nearly all respondents for 4 out of the 5 assessments. Only for the organisational learning attribute the assessment was considered to be too lenient and most participants did not think the organisation had reached maturity level 4 in this area. Review of the interviews after the meeting, shows that this can partly be explained by the fact that much of the organisational learning that is measured is implicitly present in the assessed organisation although these practices are not explicitly thought of as organisational learning by the respondents. Only half the respondents in the survey were also part of the assessment, while the others were only involved in the evaluation. Therefore, the fact that the assessment for 3 of the 4 attributes fits really well with the personal opinion of most of the respondents, with even both positive and negative deviations for two attributes where some respondents partly disagree, shows that the assessment managed to assess the maturity of the organisation with sufficient accuracy to be useful in the further discussion of these attributes.
The top right graph in Figure 4 shows that, for each of the 5 assessment in the case study, there was strong agreement with the improvements proposed by the maturity model. This shows that the maturity model was useful in identifying meaningful improvement suggestions for each of the assessed attributes.
The bottom left graph in Figure 4 shows the novelty of the results of the assessment for the participants in the evaluation of the study. Although there are large differences between different attributes and different participants we can conclude that each of the assessment conclusions only contained few new elements or none at all for most of the participants. Some of the suggested improvements were already things that the organisation was actively working on, or that many people were aware of could be improved. This shows that the strength of the maturity model does not lie in that it identifies new and unknown weaknesses in an organisation's IT dependability management. That so many of the conclusions of the assessment were not new to most of the participants of the study is possibly a consequence of the organisation already actively working with improvement of its IT dependability management, which also shows in the relatively high maturity level of the organisation. For an organisation at level 1 or 2, it might be assumed that more of the conclusions will be new to the organisation as less people will be actively working with IT dependability.
The final, bottom right graph in Figure 4 is the most important graph and shows that all participants saw a lot to very much value for the organisation in each of the assessments. Only one participant saw no value at all in the assessment of the first two attributes, but then saw very much value in the other assessments. From this participant's free-text comments it is clear that this is because there was nothing new about these two first results for this participant and the participant considered the improvement suggestions as things that were already actively being worked on. Across all participants and across all 5 assessments, we can conclude that the assessments were experienced as very valuable for the organisation.
Especially this last result is very significant and shows that the participants agreed that the IDEM3 maturity model can play an important role in the assessment and improvement of an organisation's IT dependability processes. The answers to the open questions show that the most important role of the assessment for the participants is that it is a very good way to involve all stakeholders in an organized discussion and that the spider graphs offers an easy-to-understand overview of the current maturity level of the organisation and the short term improvement goals. The main shortcoming of the maturity model, mentioned in the free-text answers of multiple participants in the focus group meeting, was that although the IDEM3 framework suggests a list of improvements, it does not explicitly say how they should be implemented and who should be responsible. Unfortunately this is not an element that can easily be added to the maturity model without losing general applicability across many types of organisations. The organisation of responsibilities concerning IT dependability can vary a lot between organisations. Also for the method used to implement the improvements, an organisation should use the methods they are already most familiar with, for example Plan-Do-Check-Act (Pittman & Russell, 1998) .
Discussion of the results
From the results of these two assessments and the evaluations of these assessments we can draw a number of conclusions. First of all, the case studies show that the IDEM3 maturity model can be used to conduct an assessment of the IT dependability of an organisation with a relatively small effort. An extensive assessment that includes all the attributes of the model and multiple IT systems should be possible with a total interview time of 30 to 40 hours, and should include between 10 and 20 participants. This means that the application of this framework is also possible for smaller organisations that only have a small IT-unit without taking up too many resources.
Secondly, concerning the correctness of the assessment, the case studies show that the maturity model managed to correctly assess the maturity level of the organisation for most of the attributes and to identify the most important improvement areas for all attributes. The focus group meeting at the end of the assessment can be used to fix the any small errors in the maturity levels, if necessary. The case studies therefore show that the correctness of the assessment is more than sufficient to be useful to form the basis for process improvement.
Thirdly, concerning the value of the IDEM3 maturity model, the case studies are very clear. There is strong evidence that the assessment as a whole was experienced as very valuable by all the participants in the study. The evaluation also shows that the value does not, as might first be suspected, lie in the power of the assessment to identify previously unknown shortcomings in an organisation's IT dependability management. On the contrary, the assessment identified mostly problems that were already known by many of the participants. The value of the assessment lies in its power to bring together all stakeholders in the IT dependability management of an organisation and to present them with a clear summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation in this area. This then forms the basis for process improvement in this area.
The apparent contradiction between the low novelty and the high value of the results of the assessment shows that the most important part of the maturity model is not the details of each of the attributes, but to provide an organised approach for implementing improvements in IT dependability management. This is also confirmed by the positive response to the spider graph, as it is seen as a practical way to communicate the organisations progress to all involved parties.
Validity discussion
During the course of this study a number of threats to the validity of the study were identified. First of all, these first evaluations of the IDEM3 were conducted by the authors of the maturity model and therefore some measures needed to be taken to minimize the bias in the results. The two hospitals that were the subject of this case study were not part of the case studies that supplied the data that lead to the development of the maturity model and had no prior experience with the IDEM3 maturity model. The respondents to the surveys used in the second evaluation were given the possibility of answering the survey anonymously and independently of each other. Although politeness could have enticed the respondents to answer more positively, the positive response to the value of the maturity model is strong enough (with many scores of 7 out of 7 on the value question) to allow us to assume that this is not a major factor in the evaluation.
Secondly, to avoid errors in the assessment part of the evaluation, the telephone interviews were recorded when possible, and these recordings were then used in the analysis of the maturity level of the organisation. All interviews were conducted by the first author but the results of the assessment were discussed with the other authors. For the preparation of the interviews, as well as for the planning of some of the other aspects of these case studies, the guidelines from Yin (2003) were followed.
Thirdly, and most importantly, this first evaluation of the IDEM3 maturity model has only involved two hospitals served by the same IT organisation. Therefore the results cannot be generalized to other organisations or other settings. Because of the large amount of work involved in the assessments and the evaluation, it is impossible to show generalizable results before the maturity model is being independently used by a larger group of users. However, these two case studies show the applicability of the evaluation plan and the positive results provide a strong argument to continue the evaluation and to promote the use of the IDEM3 maturity model to a larger audience with the help of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.
To further check the validity of the results of this study, the final version of this paper has been reviewed and approved by the two hospitals that participated in the study. Several months after the completion of the studies, the organisations themselves report an increased understanding between IT personnel, users and safety personnel, as a result of the discussions started by the assessment based on the IDEM3 maturity model. To really determine the value of the improvements made in the organisation, a new assessment would need to be done, to investigate if a higher maturity level can be measured. However, this is outside of the scope of this evaluation.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The IDEM3 maturity model is a process improvement framework in the field of IT dependability management. The maturity model is based on 22 attributes divided over 4 categories. An organisation can use the maturity model by first using the maturity model to conduct an assessment for each of the attributes by mapping the organisation's current practices to one of the 5 levels defined for each attribute.
In this paper, an evaluation plan for IDEM3 assessments is presented and applied in two case studies. The goal of this evaluation plan is to enable the evaluation of the usability, the correctness and the value of the IDEM3 maturity model for the assessment of the IT dependability management in an organisation. Although only two small evaluations were performed, these first studies present practical evidence that this framework can be used to quickly and relatively easily conduct an assessment of an organisations IT dependability management. The assessment was seen as very valuable by the assessed organisation, especially because it creates a common understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and explicitly brings all stakeholders together to discuss and deal with these issues. This is a strong argument for continuing the evaluation of the maturity model.
After updating the IDEM3 maturity model based on the feedback of this study, version 1.0 of the maturity model is ready to be distributed to a wider set of users through the Swedish Emergency Management Agency who are the agency responsible for coordinating information safety in Sweden. Future work with the IDEM3 maturity model could focus on evaluating the assessment with the help of the IDEM3 maturity model at other types of organisations. Another way to evaluate the reliability of the assessment would, for example, be to have an independent assessment of different groups of systems at the same organisation. Future evaluations should also focus on the process improvement aspect of the maturity model, following an organisation during the implementation of IT dependability improvements based on the IDEM3 maturity model.
